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This paper belongs to a wider project I have been conducting with Professor Agnieszka Bień-Kacała on illiberal 
constitutionalism. Therefore, this paper has two distinct but interrelated and unevenly discussed focuses: how the 
emergency power can be abused even in a constitutionally well-equipped emergency regime (primary focus), 
and whether the actual abuse and misuse of these powers have effectuated any changes in Hungarian illiberal 
constitutionalism until 30 April 2020 (consequential result).  
The constitutions of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region, including the Hungarian Fundamental Law, 
exemplify a judicial or constitutional model for emergencies and emergency powers. This paper claims that 
Hungary could exemplify how to be constitutionally well equipped to deal with emergencies and still able to 
abuse them. It concludes that the abuse and misuse of constitutional emergency regimes, in Hungary, have two 
layers: the actual abuse of emergency powers, be those extra-constitutional (the “crisis situation caused by mass 
migration” since 2015) or (partially) non-constitutional (COVID-19 crisis, 2020), and the abusive regulation of 
emergencies and powers (2015, 2016, 2020) by bypassing constitutional procedures and resorting to secrecy, 
including the non-transparency of decisions and vague drafting. The paper holds the view that – as long as we do 
not see what the Government does at the end of the COVID-19 crisis and how all the emergency measures and 
other illiberal actions taken in and before 2020 add up – Hungary continues with its illiberal constitutionalism.  
 
Keywords: emergency, emergency legislation, normal-time tools, COVID-19 crisis, “crisis situation caused by 
mass migration”, “state of danger”, “state of terrorist threat”, abuse, Hungary, illiberal constitutionalism  
 
I. Introduction  
 
1. The context 
 
This paper belongs to a project I have been conducting with Professor Agnieszka Bień-Kacała 
on illiberal constitutionalism.2 Therefore, the paper has two distinct but interrelated and 
unevenly discussed focuses. It is primarily engaged with the discussion of how emergency 
powers have been abused in Hungary. As a consequential effect, it can also contribute to the 
exploration of whether the actual abuse and misuse of these powers effectuated any changes 
in the illiberal Hungarian constitutionalism until 30 April 2020.  
 
Those interested in the broader context might wish to have a look at our edited book,3 
articles,4 book chapters,5 conference presentations,6 and blog posts.7 In these publications, we 
 
1* Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Pécs, Hungary, drinoczi.timea@ajk.pte.hu. 
2 National Science Centre, Poland, 2018/29/B/HS5/00232, “Illiberal constitutionalism in Poland and Hungary”. 
3 T Drinóczi and A Bień-Kacała, eds, Rule of Law, Common Values and Illiberal Constitutionalism: Poland and 
Hungary within the European Union (Routledge 2020, forthcoming). 
4 T Drinóczi and A Bień-Kacała, ‘Illiberal constitutionalism – the case of Hungary and Poland’, 20 German Law 
Journal (2019) 1140-1166; T Drinóczi and A Bień-Kacała, ‘Extra-legal particularities and illiberal 
constitutionalism. The case of Hungary and Poland’, Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies 59, No 4, pp. 338–354 
(2018); T Drinóczi and A Bień-Kacała, ‘The “DNA” of Illiberal Constitutionalism: Failure of Public Law 
Mechanisms and an Emotionally Unstable Identity. A Hungarian and Polish Insight’, Percorsi Costituzionali 
(2020, forthcoming).  
5 T Drinóczi and A Bień-Kacała, ‘Illiberal constitutionalism in Hungary and Poland: The case of judicialization 
of politics’ in A Bień-Kacała, et al., eds, Liberal Constitutionalism – Between Individual and Collective Interests 
(Toruń, 2017), https://repozytorium.umk.pl/handle/item/4861 73-108. 
 2 
explain how we conceptualize illiberal constitutionalism, what we think about the value 
orientation and the emotional and historical trajectories of Hungarians (and Poles) that have 
facilitated the emergence and consolidation of illiberal constitutionalism, how the COVID-19 
pandemic could change our current regime. Below, I summarize our views.   
 
‘Illiberal constitutionalism’ has been established and consolidated in Hungary and Poland by 
capturing constitutions and constitutionalism. The ‘capturing’ mechanism appears through the 
manner in which the constitutional changes are implemented, political and legal 
constitutionalism is theorized, and constitutional/national identity is interpreted. It is also 
present in the relativization of the rule of law, democracy and human rights, the 
constitutionalization of populist nationalism, identity politics, new patrimonialism, 
clientelism, and corruption. Illiberal constitutionalism is viewed as the functioning of a public 
power that upholds the main constitutional structure but lacks a normative domestic 
constitutional commitment to constraints on public power, even while, to a certain extent, it 
remains within the boundaries set by EU law and politics, as well as international minimum 
requirements. In these states, all elements of constitutional democracy, such as the rule of law, 
democracy, and human rights, are observable, yet none prevails in its entirety. In our view, 
illiberal constitutionalism is not the opposite of liberal constitutionalism and does not equal 
with authoritarianism. Consequently, constitutional democracy still exists, but its formal 
implementation outweighs its substantial realization. That, in turn, serves the fulfilment of the 
populist agenda and further consolidates the new regime, which creates a vicious circle. 
Development of illiberal constitutionalism, and, consequently, the failure of public law 
mechanisms, is also fuelled by the emotional attitudes that have evolved throughout the 
histories of the two nations. These non-legal aspects of Hungarian and Polish illiberalism, 
which seem to be embedded in the national identity constructions, find support in different 
fields of social sciences. It thus seems that the need for strong autocratic leadership and these 
nations’ receptivity to populism, and, as a result, the unavoidable failure of public law 
mechanisms, have been influenced by historical particularities and emotional trajectory. If it 
is indeed the case, constitutional identity may have been built in a way that, to a certain 
extent, has been pre-determined and which has led to the current situation of illiberalism.  
 
Against this background, I am discussing the issue of use, abuse, and misuse of emergency 
powers in Hungary.  
 
2. Introduction to constitutional emergencies and Hungary  
 
The constitutions of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) states exemplify a judicial or 
constitutional model for the treatment of emergencies and emergency powers.8 When 
 
6 A former version of ‘The “DNA” of Illiberal Constitutionalism: Failure of Public Law Mechanisms and an 
Emotionally Unstable Identity. A Hungarian and Polish Insight’ is accessible at researchgate and academia.edu. 
7 T Drinóczi and A Bień-Kacała, ‘Illiberal Constitutionalism at Work: The First Two Weeks of COVID-19 in 
Hungary and Poland’, VerfBlog, 2020/3/31, https://verfassungsblog.de/illiberal-constitutionalism-at-work/. For a 
further insight on Poland from April, 2020 see, A Bień-Kacała, ‘Polexit is Coming or is it Already Here? 
Comments on the Judicial Independence Decisions of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, 
Apr. 28, 2020, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2020/04/polexit-is-coming-or-is-it-already-here-comments-on-
the-judicial-independence-decisions-of-the-polish-constitutional-tribunal 
8 Besides this model, there are also the legislative and the executive model; on them, see, e.g., D Dyzenhaus, 
‘States of Emergency’, in M Rosenfeld and A Sajó, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional 
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012) 442–462; J Ferejohn and P Policastro, “The law of the exception: a 
typology of emergency powers” 2 ICON (2004) 210–239; H Kelsen, “Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein?” 
Die Justiz VI/11-12. 1930–1931; C Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (JCB Mohr, Tübingen, 1931); M 
Tushnet, “Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism” in M Tushnet (ed), The Constitution in Wartime: 
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regulating emergencies, the constituent powers of most CEE states have duly considered their 
past9 and the dichotomy between lessening constitutional burdens in emergencies and the 
need to avoid the abuse of power. They contain rigorous and detailed rules – just as it has 
been demanded by scholars, the Venice Commission, policy papers, and constitutional 
legislators, as well.10 Accordingly, these rules cover the “who does what in which kind of 
emergency and for how long” question. They provide for the prohibition on the suspension of 
the constitution and the functioning of the constitutional court and specify human rights 
derogations. They also require the observance of the principles of temporality and 
functionality, necessity and proportionality, legality, continuity, and constitutionality, i.e., 
constitutional review.  
The Hungarian Fundamental Law (FL) certainly adopts this model. The constitutional 
emergency model is located in a separate part of the constitution and called “special legal 
order”.11  
 
Nevertheless, since 2015, the Hungarian Government has reacted to the challenges of 
migration (2015) and terrorism (2016) by instituting two new emergencies. In March 2020, as 
a response to the COVID-19, it, based on a broad interpretation, activated an existing 
constitutional emergency regime called “state of danger”. In 2015, the ordinary legislative 
power enacted rules governing the “crisis situation caused by mass migration”, while a 
constitutional amendment introduced a new category of emergency, known as the “state of 
terrorist threat” in 2016. Both emergencies are responses to actual and existing threats, whose 
presence in Hungary, however, has been exaggerated.12 The “crisis situation caused by mass 
migration” does not qualify as a “special legal order” under the FL as it still does not 
incorporate it. However, it seems to mirror a “special legal orders” as it rules on the 
deployment of the army and human rights derogation. On the other hand, the scope and 
structure of the category “state of terrorist threat” may be an example for other states to 
follow if they wish to constitutionalize the actions they intend to take in fighting terrorism. 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that the Hungarian constitutional amendment process, with its 
hasty and non-transparent nature, and to a certain extent, vague drafting formulations, should 
not be viewed as a role model. Bypassing constitutional emergency rules, developing and 
operating a new emergency regime (2015) and creating an unlimited authorization, both in 
 
Beyond Alarmism and Complacency (Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2005); On Hungary, until 2016, T 
Drinóczi, “Special legal orders; challenges and solutions” 4 Osteuropa Recht (2016) 420–437; and until 2018, 
see more in T Drinóczi, ‘Central and Eastern European constitutional formulas: the abuse and observance of 
constitutions in times of emergency’, THE 10TH IACL-AIDC World Congress 2018; Workshop Abuse of the 
Constitution in Times of Emergency, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335762469_Central_and_Eastern_European_constitutional_formulas_t
he_abuse_and_observance_of_constitutions_in_times_of_emergency.  
9 See, e.g., the Hungarian revolution in 1956 and the martial law of Jaruzelski in Poland in 1981.  
10 See, e.g., B Ackermann, “The Emergency Constitution”, Faculty Scholarship Series Paper 121, 
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/121 1029–1091; Venice Commission, “Emergency power, 
science and technique of democracy” No 12 (1995), CDL-STD (1995) 012; A Khakee, "Securing democracy? A 
comparative analysis of emergency powers in Europe" (Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed 
Forces 2009), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/99550/PP30_Anna_Khakee_Emergency_Powers.pdf; Opinion on the 
draft constitutional law on “Protection of the nation” of France, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106th 
Plenary Session (Venice, 11–12 March 2016); and O Duhamel, “Terrorism and Constitutional amendment in 
France”, 1 European Constitutional Law Review (2016) 15. 
11 Art 48-54 FL, under the heading of Special legal order within the chapter on the State. 
12 The migration crisis had its peak in 2015, and, in reality, Hungary, fortunately, has not experienced and terror 
attacks – which view is not shared by political propaganda, which puts an equation mark between migration with 
terrorism. 
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time and subject matter, in 2020,13 should not be followed, either. This paper explores why 
Hungary could exemplify how to be constitutionally well equipped to deal with emergencies 
but still able to abuse these regimes. It also identifies the layers of the abuse of constitutional 
emergency regimes but still claims that Hungary features illiberal constitutionalism.14 For an 
informed reconsideration, we shall see the synergy of the Government’s decisions about the 
termination of the emergency and all related fields and other actions taken in 2020 and before.  
 
The paper is structured as follows: the regional constitutional emergency model is reviewed in 
section II. Section III is dedicated to the discussion of the Hungarian constitutional design 
called “special legal order”. The next section (IV) explores how migration and terrorism and 
their (both real and imagined) threat lead to the abuse of constitutional regime and drafting 
principles. Section V investigates how the real COVID-19 crisis is managed by activating one 
of the constitutional emergency regimes, called “state of danger”, and what implications it has 
on the state of illiberal constitutionalism. The paper concludes with point VI.  
 
II. The constitutional model of emergency powers – the CEE regional approach   
 
The constitutional treatment of emergencies in the CEE region is based on functionality and 
temporality. It is expected to be able to overcome the threat, which is viewed as exceptional 
and re-establish the normal functioning of the regular government. There should be a 
threshold of risk and danger, which has to be crossed before an emergency is declared.15 It is 
not wise to announce any emergency if the threat is not actual or imminent, does not involve 
the whole or the majority of the nation, or does not affect the entire territory of the state or 
parts thereof, etc.16 Otherwise, it could easily lead to an abuse of power. This dichotomy, i.e., 
the claim for efficiency and the fear of abuse of power, explains the level of elaboration found 
in constitutional texts in the CEE region. Generally speaking, the higher the fear of abuse of 
power, the more detailed the constitutional regulations on emergencies.17 Therefore, what is to 
be avoided with these elaborated constitutional rules is the destabilization of the existing 
order.  
 
The greatest danger a state and its population can be is the war or revolution, a coup d’état, a 
national disaster, a catastrophe, and, as we can now experience a highly contagious pandemic. 
In each case, different types of emergencies can be introduced. It is usually done by the 
parliament if the danger is severe and involves armed attack; these are usually called “state of 
war” or “martial law”.18 When there is a non-armed threat,19 usually, a so-called “state of 
 
13 Coronavirus Act 2020, https://hungarianspectrum.org/2020/03/21/translation-of-draft-law-on-protecting-
against-the-coronavirus/ 
14 Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, n. 4 (2019). 
15 A Jakab and Sz Till, “A különleges jogrend” [The special legal order], in Trócsányi László and Schanda 
Balázs (eds), Bevezetés az alkotmányjogba; Az Alaptörvény és Magyarország alkotmányos intézményei 
[Introduction to constitutional law, The Fundamental Law and constitutional institutions of Hungary] 
http://www.tankonyvtar.hu/hu/tartalom/tamop425/2011_0001_548_Alkotmanyjog/ch18.html  
16 For other conditions, see Opinion 359/2005 in the context of international obligations and the wording of the 
Hungarian constitutions, Slovenian or Croatian constitutions. See also the relevant chapters in N Chronowski, T 
Drinóczi and T Takács, eds, Governmental Systems of Central and Eastern European States (Wolters Kluwer 
Polska – OFICYNA, Warsawa, 2011) written by N Chronowski, T Drinóczi, J Petrétei on Hungary, Z Lauc and 
S Ivanda on Croatia, and Pernuš respectively.  
17 Jakab and Till, ibid. 
18 The CEE constitutions contain proper definitions of, for example, “state of war” or “state of emergency”, as 
follows: an imminent threat to the independence of the state, armed aggression, imminent danger, a general 
danger that threatens the existence of the state, severe acts of violence endangering life, etc. See, e.g., Croatia, 
Poland, Slovenia, Hungary, Latvia. A Bień-Kacała, “Category of security in light of Polish Constitution” in A 
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emergency” is declared by the executive power with a subsequent parliamentary approval and 
oversight. The CEE constitutions name these situations national disaster and catastrophe,20 
“other danger threatening life and health”,21 or social peace.22 The Estonian constitution is the 
only one that rules on a state of emergency that is to be introduced to “prevent the spread of 
an infectious disease”.  
 
Constitutions usually provide for common rules applicable to each type of emergencies. Each 
CEE constitution23 explicitly or implicitly requires that all three state power work together.24 
It is usually the national parliament that declares a state of war, martial law, or state of 
emergency. The executive and the president are also involved in this process. Their 
engagement is more significant when the national parliament cannot be summoned or 
function. In this case, the president usually declares the emergency, or a unique organ will be 
established with the participation of members of the parliament, government, and, in some 
instances, the president or constitutional court. The examples for this latter one is Hungary 
and Slovakia.25 The design is slightly different in Poland, where it is the president who 
announces “martial law” and “state of emergency” on request of the government. The 
regulation on the introduction of any emergency shall subsequently be submitted to the Sejm. 
 
The existence of any kind of emergency is time-sensitive, precisely because they are 
dangerous for constitutionalism. Emergencies can be maintained as long as they are needed, 
or for a definite period. In the former case, determining the end of an emergency is the 
responsibility of the state organ involved in its declaration, like in Hungary. The Polish “state 
of emergency” can be announced only for a definite period, but no longer than 90 days. Its 
extension may be made once only for a period no longer than 60 days and with the consent of 
the Sejm. A “state of natural disaster” can be introduced for no longer than 30 days and can be 
extended only with the consent of the Sejm.26 This time-sensitivity is generally stipulated by 
other CEE constitutions as well, with the exceptions of the Czech Republic and Slovakia – but 
it does not mean that the constitutional guarantees would be less binding or severe. Their 
constitutions provide for only the main competences regarding the declaration of emergency, 
the deployment of the army, and a brief definition of war. They leave the details to be decided 
by a qualified majority of the parliament in a constitutional act. This qualified majority 
requires the approval of, for instance, in the Czech Republic, 3/5 of the deputies, and 3/5 of 
senators.27  
 
Bień-Kacała et al, eds., Security in V4 constitutions and political practices (Wydawnictwo Wydziału Prawa I 
Administracji Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, Toruń, 2016) 48–49; S Pernuš, “The Governmental System of 
Republic of Slovenia” in Chronowski and Drinóczi and Takács, eds., n 16, 718–719; D Iljanova, “The 
Governmental System of the Republic of Latvia” in Chronowski and Drinóczi and Takács, eds., n 16, 409. 
19 CEE constitutions usually contain one or more of the crisis from the list above.  
20 Explicitly: Estonia, Poland, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia; implicitly: Bulgaria, Slovenia. 
21 Czech Republic. 
22 Lithuania. 
23 Drinóczi, n 8 (2016) 420–437. 
24 Just as is demanded by Dyzenhaus. See Dyzenhaus, n 8, 446. 
25 M Domin, “Constitutional mechanisms for eliminating security risks” in A Bień-Kacała et al, eds, n 17, 158–
159. 
26 These two Polish measures can affect a part or the whole territory of the state. 
27 See Constitutional Act Nr 110/1998 Coll on Security of the Czech Republic, Constitutional Act Nr 227/2002 
Coll on State Security at the Time of War, State of War, State of Emergency, and State of Crisis (Slovakia). See 
further in J Filip, P Molek, and Ladislav Vyhnánek, “Governance in the Czech Republic” in Chronowski and 
Drinóczi and Takács, eds., n 16, 200–201; and L Cibulka and L Mokrá, “The Slovak Republic” in Chronowski, 
T Drinóczi and Takács, eds., n 16, 692–693; V Jirásova and J Jirásek, “Concept of security of Czech Republic” 
in Bień-Kacała, et al, eds., n 17, 65, 73–74; M Giba, ‘State Security’, in Bień-Kacała, et al, eds, n 17, 125, 129. 
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During any kind of emergency, without exceptions, mandates of national parliaments, and 
presidents, local governments are to be extended until the end of the emergency, or even 
more. In Poland, for instance, these mandates are prolonged for 90 days after the termination 
of the crisis. Constitutions also provide for the immediate/as soon as possible election of the 
new representative body after the termination of the emergency, and the need for continuous 
operation of the elected bodies, especially parliaments. New elections cannot be held during 
the crisis.28 In some states, there is a ban on holding a referendum on the introduction of any 
type of emergency.29  
 
In the case of war or martial law, extraordinary measures are usually introduced by the 
parliament, except when it is not able to function; in the latter case, the executive can act 
within the time limits set by the constitution and under subsequent parliamentary control. The 
army is usually deployed by the parliament; the commander-in-chief is the president; when 
immediate action is required, or a military decision is urgently needed due to international 
obligations, the government has a constitutional mandate to decide on the deployment of the 
army outside of the state’s borders. 
In non-armed threat imposed emergencies, it is usually the executive power, either the 
government or the president that is constitutionally authorized to act, with a periodical and 
subsequent parliamentary oversight. However, it is not a general rule, as, for instance, in 
Poland, such a power may be exercised only by the president and only during a martial law if 
the parliament is not able to sit. 
The emergency measures are typically limited in time. The Hungarian emergency measures 
lose their temporal effect by the end of the particular emergency, or the elapse of the time-
period stipulated by the FL for the particular emergency. The Czech Republic can have 
emergency governance only for 30 days. These measures can be adopted under a special 
authorization regime, stemming from the constitution itself. Constitutions also delegate 
special law-making competence to the executive power30 in the shape of decrees that have the 
force of law because they may derogate from statutes.31  
 
The enumeration of non-derogable fundamental rights varies in CEE constitutions in terms of 
the range they cover, but they are inspired by Article 15 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).32 During their respective constitution-making processes, drafters 
adopted the main idea behind Article 15 ECHR to their national requirements.33 It is why it is 
 
28 E.g., Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Croatia, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria. See also Pernuš, n 17, 717–718; 
Bień-Kacała, n 17, 57. 
29 Eg., Estonia, Latvia,  
30 An exception is Bulgaria, where the delegation of law-making competences to the executive itself is prohibited 
for historical reasons. The Tzar, the Presidium of the National Assembly, and the State Council used to abuse 
these delegated powers. E Tanchev and M Belov, ‘The governmental system of the Republic of Bulgaria’, in N 
Chronowski, T Drinóczi and T Takács, eds., n 16, 93. 
31 E.g., Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Croatia, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria. 
32 See, e.g., “Guide on Article 15 of the Convention – Derogation in time of emergency”, Council of 
Europe/European Court of Human Rights, 2016, http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_15_ENG.pdf. 
33 Amidst the COVID-19 crisis, by 6 April 2020, 8 countries, including Estonia, Latvia, and Romania from the 
CEE region, have notified the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe of their derogations from the ECHR. 
K Istrefi, ‘Supervision of Derogations in the Wake of COVID-19: a litmus test for the Secretary-General of the 
Council of Europe’, https://www.ejiltalk.org/supervision-of-derogations-in-the-wake-of-covid-19-a-litmus-test-
for-the-secretary-general-of-the-council-of-europe/; S Molloy, ‘COVID-19 and Derogations Before the 
European Court of Human Rights’, VerfBlog, 2020/4/10, https://verfassungsblog.de/covid-19-and-derogations-
before-the-european-court-of-human-rights/ 
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not only the right to life,34 the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment,35 and of slavery, and the nullum crimen, nulla poena principle have been 
established as non-derogable rights in emergencies, but many others, too. For example, the 
prohibition of assimilation (Bulgaria, Serbia), the protection of dignity and freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion (each constitution), family, marriage, the rights of the child 
(Serbia, Poland), and the right to citizenship (Serbia, Poland). In Latvia, however, the 
constitution is silent in this regard, and only the relevant Act provides for rules on derogations 
in emergencies, which is considered a significant deficiency of the Latvian constitution.36 It is 
not only the above-mentioned introduction of extra measures but also the derogation from 
fundamental rights that are limited in time and are subject to parliamentary oversight.37  
 
In the CEE states, constitutions have employed a judicial model with a detailed constitutional 
design, even if, in some cases, the detailedness covers only the armed threat imposed 
emergencies, e.g., in the Polish Constitution. According to this model, constitutions cannot be 
suspended or changed,38 the constitutional rules on the emergency are not to be modified,39 
the operation of constitutional courts cannot be suspended,40 the president of the constitutional 
court is involved in decision-making bodies,41 the constitutional court decides on the 
constitutionality of the introduction of the emergency.42 Constitutions emphasize temporality, 
cooperation, purpose-orientation, necessity, and proportionality, along with constitutionality 
and legality, and continuous operation of state organs, including the judiciary and 
constitutional courts, as well. Some decisions of the legality of restrictive measures 
introduced as a response to the COVID-19 crisis have already been delivered.43 
 
 
34 See, e.g., the decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 30 September 2008, file nr K44/07; 
126/7/A/2008. An English summary is available at 
http://trybunal.gov.pl/fileadmin/content/omowienia/K_44_07_GB.pdf (civil aircraft must not be shot down even 
if it seems to be necessary for state security). 
35 For the discussion of the absolute nature of this prohibition, see, e.g., S Greer, ‘Is the prohibition against 
torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment really “absolute” in international human rights law?’, 15 Human 
Rights Law Review (2015); M Hodas, “Security and other values protected by constitution” in Bień-Kacała et al, 
eds, n 17, 149–153; A Jakab, ‘Breaching constitutional law on moral grounds in the fight against terrorism: 
Implied presuppositions and proposed solutions in the discourse on ‘the Rule of Law vs. Terrorism’‚ 1 ICON 
(2011) 58–78.  
36 “The Constitution itself does not regulate possible restrictions on human rights during a state of emergency. 
Various commentators believe this is quite a fundamental deficiency of the Constitution since it means there is 
no constitutionally determined difference between the human rights regime in ordinary circumstances and the 
regime during a state of emergency. Establishing a distinction of this kind would make it possible to assess the 
restrictions required during a state of emergency.” D Iljanova, ‘The Governmental System of the Republic of 
Latvia’, in Chronowski and Drinóczi and Takács, eds., n 16, 410. 
37 E.g., Macedonia. K Schrameyer, ‘The Republic of Macedonia’, in N Chronowski, T Drinóczi and T Takács, 
eds., n 16, 494–495. For Slovakia, see Domin, n 23, 157. In the case of Estonia, this oversight is carried out by 
the Chancellor of Justice. J Põld, B Aaviksoo and R Laffranque, ‘Governmental system of Estonia’, in 
Chronowski, Drinóczi and Takács, eds., n 16, 276.   
38 Eg, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Estonia. See also Bień-Kacała, n 10, 55–56; M Pajvancic, ‘Governmental system 
of Serbia’, in Chronowski,  Drinóczi and Takács, eds., n 16, 626; Põld, Aaviksoo and Laffranque, n 35, 529.  
39 Estonia, Lithuania  
40 Eg, in Hungary.  
41 See the contribution of the Hungarian President of the Constitutional Court in the Defence Council, which has 
to be established when the “state of national crisis” is declared.  
42 Slovakia. 
43 On April 23, Prague's district court declared four of the health minister’s coronavirus regulations unlawful (on 
the freedom of movement and retail trade). These measures, however, did not base on the crisis law but the 
health protection law. https://www.dw.com/en/covid-19-restrictions-eased-in-the-czech-republic-long-live-
freedom/a-53262812. 
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III. Constitutional emergency regimes in the Hungarian FL  
 
The FL lists and elaborates on six different emergencies, and, as mentioned, contain rules on 
the most critical questions, such as ‘Who introduce What kind of emergency measures and 
When?’, ‘Who is in charge?’ and ‘What can and cannot be done?’. It requires temporality, 
continuity and constitutionality, legality, and proportionality and necessity. The FL also 
allows a more severe restriction of fundamental rights, but, at the same time, lists the non-
derogable human rights, as well.  
 
1. What to be declared?  
 
The “state of national crisis” is to be declared in the case of war or danger of war, while the 
“state of emergency” is designed for dealing with coup d’état-type and revolution-type crises. 
The “state of preventive defense” means a danger of external armed attack; it can also be 
declared when an obligation arising from an alliance shall be met. The most temporary 
emergency is the “unexpected attack by external armed groups into the territory of Hungary” 
because it is to be introduced until the decision is made on the declaration of a “state of 
emergency” or “state of national crisis”. The fifth is the “danger of crisis” to be declared in 
the case of natural disaster or industrial accident endangering life and property, which was 
activated on 11 March 2020.44 The sixth is the “state of terrorist threat” was inserted into the 
FL by the Sixth Amendment in 2016; it can be introduced in the case of a significant and 
direct threat of a terrorist attack or actual terrorist attack. Undoubtedly, by incorporating the 
state of terrorist threat into the constitutional text, Hungary has broken fresh ground in a 
constitutional design concerning emergencies.   
 
Acts of Parliaments have detailed regulations on emergencies, such as, e.g., the Act on 
national defense and armed forces (2011), or when discussing the current epidemic, the Act 
on catastrophes (2011). These statutes elaborate on the notion of the particular emergency, 
stipulates procedural, substantial, and organizational rules applicable in an emergency. They 
thus combine regulations that apply in “peace” and their respective emergencies.  
 
2. Who declares emergencies and who acts during emergencies?  
 
The FL explicitly indicates the agents who act in a particular emergency. In situations of the 
gravest danger (the first three types enumerated above45 and the “state of terrorist attack”), the 
FL distinguishes between those agencies declaring the emergency and those exercising 
emergency powers. The “state of national crisis” and a “state of emergency” is introduced by 
the Hungarian Parliament, which, only in a “state of national crisis”, must set up the National 
Defense Council. In a “state of national crisis”, it is the National Defense Council that 
exercises parliamentary powers and deploys the military even in Hungarian soil,46 and makes 
other military-related decisions. In the case of a “state of emergency”, the Hungarian army, 
based on a parliamentary decision,47 may only be deployed in Hungary only if the actions of 
the police and the national security services prove to be insufficient. As can be seen, the 
categories “state of preventive defense” and “unexpected attack” are also connected to armed 
conflicts. In contrast, the category of "state of danger" is declared when serious national or 
 
44 It worth noting that these five were the constitutional institutions of the former Constitution, which were 
copied to the FL in 2011. The FL structures them and provides for a more detailed regulation. 
45 “State of national crisis”, the “state of emergency”, and the “state of preventive defense”. 
46 In peacetime, the national army must not be deployed on Hungarian soil. 
47 If the Parliament is prevented from making the mentioned decisions, the President of the Republic must do so. 
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industrial danger threatens. In these situations, it is the Government that is entitled to declare 
these situations and deals with them accordingly.   
 
Agencies exercising emergency powers in any of the above-mentioned crises are authorized 
by the FL to take extraordinary measures that may conflict with national laws. However, these 
measures cannot suspend the FL, their effect is limited in time, and their subject matter has to 
stay within the authorization given in their implementing Act, as stipulated explicitly by the 
FL for each type of emergencies. Measures introduced in emergencies lose their temporal 
effect with the termination of the crisis, except for the initial measures of the government in 
the “state of terrorist threat” (15 days), “state of preventive defense” (60 days), and in the case 
of “state of danger” (15 days). In these latter cases, the Government, within the framework of 
the implementing Act, can deteriorate from and suspend statutory provisions in a government 
decree. In a of “state of danger” their temporal effect (15 days) can be extended with the 
consent of the Parliament. The FL, however, does not have any more explicit criteria for the 
temporal effect of the extended measures.  
 
3. Observation of emergency-related and universal principles by the FL  
 
Temporality is observed in the FL when it demands that a “special legal order” shall be 
terminated by the state organ entitled to introduce it when the conditions for its declaration no 
longer exist. It also applies to measures introduced during emergencies, e.g., the above-
mentioned 15 days rule for the temporal effect of decrees issued in the “state of danger”.  
The criterion of legality is ensured by the ex-ante existence of the implementing statute, based 
on which the emergency measures can be issued.48 These are cardinal Acts, i.e., as per the FL, 
they were adopted by the 2/3 majority of the Parliament.  
The FL assures continuity and constitutionality as the constitution cannot be suspended; the 
operation of the Constitutional Court (CC) cannot be restricted. The FL does not allow the 
termination of the Parliament's mandate only in the “state of national crisis” and the “state of 
emergency”. It also provides for the parliamentary oversight over the executive.  
The FL requires the application of proportionality when it comes to the declaration of an 
emergency and the irregular restrictions of fundamental rights. In emergencies, the exercise of 
fundamental rights – except for the right to human life and dignity, prohibitions concerning 
life and biomedical issues,49 and due process and criminal law guaranties50 – may be 
suspended or restricted beyond the extent (necessity and proportionality) specified in the FL.51  
 
Against this background, we can assess the responses the Hungarian political decision-maker 
gave to different types of challenges: migration, terrorism, and the human pandemic. As said, 
before 2020, one so-called emergency has been extra-constitutionally activated, and another 
was designed as a new emergency regime of the FL. Both of them raise concerns for 
constitutionalism. So does the COVID-19 crisis triggered activation of the “state of danger”.52 
 
IV. The abuse of emergency regimes until the COVID-19 crisis   
 
Hungary exemplifies how the constitutional regime can be bypassed in the name of politically 
generated fear, and how the elaboration of a constitutional regime can potentially be 
 
48 See, e.g., the mentioned Acts on the national defense and catastrophes. 
49 Art III FL. 
50 Art XXVIII (2) to (6) FL. 
51 Art I (3) FL. 
52 Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, n. 7. 
 10 
exploited. As noted above, Hungary, since 2015, has drafted two new emergencies. The 
“crisis situation caused by mass migration” does not qualify for a “special legal order” under 
the FL, but it, without the usual constitutional guarantees, operates like such order as far as 
the “deployment” of the army and fundamental right issues are concerned. The “state of 
terrorist threat”, which was introduced to the FL in 2016, befits the constitutional regulatory 
scheme. However, its adoption falls short of the transparency and inclusivity required of a 
constitutional amendment and may facilitate abuse of power over the army.  
 
1. “Crisis situation caused by mass migration” 
 
In its attempts to cope with the flow of migrants during the summer of 2015,53 Hungary 
developed a new emergency.54 It was, however, not implemented until the end of that summer 
because the regulatory framework was adopted only in September of 2015. Therefore, no 
action was taken during the spring of 2015 to address the actual flow of people through 
regulatory means. Instead, at that time, the Hungarian Government started an internal, 
politically motivated, and defensive anti-migration billboard campaign, and held a so-called 
“national consultation”.55 The Government finally took regulatory action in late 2015. In 
August, amending bills56 were submitted to the Parliament, which adopted them on 4 and 21 
September 2015. These Acts led to both the factual and the legal closure of Hungary’s 
borders. By erecting a fence at the Southern (Schengen) border of Hungary, the border was de 
facto closed, and so-called transit zones were created for detention purposes. Furthermore, by 
adopting modifications to, amongst others, procedural criminal law, the borders were also 
sealed de jure. These laws delineate the content of the “crisis situation caused by mass 
migration”. Its content would easily make it one of the “special legal orders” of the FL, but it 
was not intended to make the part of the FL. Therefore, the “crisis situation” should not 
behave like one of the “special legal orders”. This “crisis situation” should not permit the 
uncontrolled exercise of some powers and even more severe human rights restrictions that are 
allowed in constitutional emergencies. Nevertheless, it still does, regardless of some 
corrections. Some parts of the legal framework of the “crisis situation caused by mass 
migration” are unconstitutional and would raise serious concerns even if the crisis were 
regulated as one of the “special legal orders” of the FL, as shown below.  
 
53 Illegal border crossings increased from 2,024 (July 2014) to 16,626 (summer 2015). Source: the Hungarian 
police. 
54 The “crisis situation caused by mass immigration”. See T Drinóczi and Á Mohay, ‘Has the migration crisis 
challenged the concept of the protection of the human rights of migrants? The case of Ilias and Ahmed v. 
Hungary’, in E Kużelewska, A Weatherburn, and Dariusz Kloza, eds, Irregular migrations as a challenge for 
democracy (Intersentia 2018) 97-112. 
55 On  the “national consultation”, see 
http://www.kormany.hu/download/9/a3/50000/Nemzetikonzultacio_mmkorrnel.docx. The “National 
consultation” does not equal with the consultation process applied in the drafting process of legislation. It is a 
mere political institution that is used for legitimizing already decided political goals. The questionnaire on 
migration and terrorism (2015) successfully combined the fear of losing employment and heightened security 
threats by implying their interconnectedness. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that, according to 
the Spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey, many Europeans were concerned with security and the economic 
repercussions of the refugee crisis, but Hungarians more than any, despite their not having been attacked and 
Hungary has not having been either the chosen destination of most refugees or a Mediterranean country. R Wike, 
B Stokes, and K Simmons, "Europeans Fear Wave of Refugees Will Mean More Terrorism, Fewer Jobs. Sharp 
ideological divides across EU on views about minorities, diversity and national identity”, 
http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2016/07/Pew-Research-Center-EU-Refugees-and-National-Identity-Report-
FINAL-July-11-2016.pdf, 3. It was not Hungarian society that initially demanded special legislation dealing with 
migration; rather, it was fuelled by political intention. It is thus not surprising that this theme has been one of the 
major topics of the governing party’s election campaign leading up to the parliamentary elections of 2018. 
56 Act CXL of 2015 and Act CXLIII of 2015.  
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1.1. The principles of legality, functionality, temporality, and constitutionality  
 
The “crisis situation caused by mass migration” may be declared, as a general rule,57 if the 
number of asylum seekers arriving in Hungary exceeds an average of 500 per day over a 
month, an average of 750 per day over two consecutive weeks, or an average of 800 per day 
over a week. Additionally, the same "crisis situation" may be declared if a situation poses a 
direct threat to public safety and the maintenance of law and order in a settlement, or which 
poses an immediate threat to public health.58 The relevant governmental decree on this 
situation remains in force for a maximum period of six months; its term may be extended if 
the circumstances that gave rise to it persist.  
 
Since the entry into force of the Act establishing the “crisis situation caused by mass 
migration”, the crisis situation has not been canceled but extended to the entire country from 
time to time. In September 2019, it was also extended, even though none of the conditions for 
its extension have been met since 2016. The governmental decision on the expansion of the 
"crisis situation" does not offer any reasoning, and its rationality cannot be checked on time.59 
It terminated in March 2020, and, as it has become a practice, it was extended. The 
government claimed that, considering the flow of migrants from Turkey60, only this way 
could the safety of Hungarians be guaranteed in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Apparently, in April 2020, Hungary is under a double emergency regime: “state of danger” 
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and “crisis situation caused by mass migration”, due to the 
“migration threat”.  
 
It is warning that the Government does not acknowledge the actual end of the migration crisis 
and terminates the “crisis situation caused by mass migration” because it claims that it will lift 
the “state of danger” when the COVID-19 crisis is over. The Minister of Justice in April 2020 
argued that the end of the COVID-19 crisis would objectively be determined also by the 
international community; therefore, it would not entirely rest only on the government to 
decide.61 Numbers on the inflow of people is, however, also objective – which does not bother 
the Government. On the other hand, while the fear from migration, created mostly artificially, 
could be used for political purposes, i.e., the Government does everything it can against the 
threat without risking anything; COVID-19 is real and demands effective responses. It can, 
thus, be speculated that the timely termination of the emergency might in the interest of the 
Government. 
 
When the “crisis situation” was extended for the first time in March 2016 to the entire 
country, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee (Budapest) asked the Police and the Immigration 
Office to make public the otherwise “data of public interest”62 that they used to justify the 
 
57 For more specific rules, see http://www.kormany.hu/en/prime-minister-s-office/news/government-declares-
state-of-crisis-due-to-mass-migration-in-two-counties. 
58 This last provision will be applicable, particularly if a disturbance or violence occurs at a reception center or 
any other facility serving as a shelter for foreigners in a settlement or on its outskirts. As can be seen, it is quite a 
vague definition. 
59 See, e.g., https://www.helsinki.hu/alsaghelyzet-ez-nem-valsaghelyzet-sajat-torvenyet-is-megserti-a-kormany/  




62 Act CXII of 2011 on Informational Self-determination and Freedom of Information 
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extension. The authority declined, claiming that these data were classified for ten years.63 
Finally, the issue of secrecy versus accessibility was resolved by the Ministry of Justice one 
year later, in April 2017. The Ministry ordered the authorities to provide the data requested 
because, as stated in its long-overdue though properly argued letter, the interest in the 
classification of the data was outweighed by the public interest in access to information. 
According to this document,64 the number of irregular migrants (illegally entering into 
Hungary) between 15 September 2015 (the entry into force of the law) and 4 March 2016 (last 
available data before the request for information arrived) was as indicated in Table 1. It is also 
a relevant data that in 2018 there were 11 times fewer actions taken by border control than in 
2017 and 81 times less than in 2015.65 
 
Table 1 
 Total  Per day  
15 September–31 December 2015 189,720  1,762.2 
1–31 January 2016  502 16.1 
1–29 February 2016  2,290 78.9 
1 January–4 March 2016  3,379 52.79 
Source: http://www.helsinki.hu/wp-content/uploads/valsag_anonim.pdf 
 
It is interesting to note that the authorities did not take any proactive action as regards the 
realization of the right to information or to justify the actions of the Government: they did not 
provide any data that were not included in the request. A similar attitude was present 
concerning the sharing of data on the geographic spread of the coronavirus in March 2020.66  
 
1.2. Principles of constitutionality, necessity, and proportionality  
 
In the wake of the legislative action in 2015, the Criminal Procedure Act (CPA 1998) was 
also modified. As a result, it rendered the following provisions of the CPA inapplicable to 
migrants who attempt to enter the territory of Hungary illegally when the "crisis situation 
caused by mass migration" is in force. First, providing a translation of the indictment and the 
court’s ruling or parts thereof relating to the convicted person. Second, the CPA exemption 
rules on minors, which, in a regular criminal procedure, would involve the necessary 
guarantees a legal system has to provide for a child. These are as follows: taking the age of 
the accused into consideration; the involvement of a teacher in the proceedings as a lay 
member of the court; limited pre-trial detention; when deciding on the execution of the 
sentence, the judge deciding on its place and method, taking the accused’s age into account; in 
correctional facilities, minors being separated from adults; and the waiving of a trial not being 
an option. An amendment already in 2017 removed this exemption rule on minors and also 
provided for a mandatory presence of a defense attorney. These rules have been maintained 
by the new CPA 2017, which is in effect since 1 July 2018. It also refined the translation 
rules: now, the defendant can waive of translation, i.e., it must be provided.  
 
Nevertheless, between 2015 and 2017/2018, the new criminal procedural rules restricted and 
violated due process rights. It is questionable if, for instance, the right to human dignity and 
the right to defense is adequately ensured in the “crisis situation caused by mass migration” 
 
63 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, “Tíz évre titkosították, miért is van most válsághelyzet” [“The reason for the crisis 




66 See in point V. 1.  
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when no translation is provided, and the accused is just the object of the state’s actions. The 
exclusion of rules on minors certainly affects human dignity and their right stipulated in the 
FL in harmony with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Moreover, such exclusion 
is discriminatory as we cannot find any objective reason for unequal treatment. As said, even 
if the “crisis situation caused by mass migration” were to be considered as a “special legal 
order” (which is not the case), the potential for the violation of the human dignity of the child 
could have been legitimately raised. 
 
Regardless of what the Hungarian Government thinks about these “emergency measures”, 
which are clearly unconstitutional, their logic is followed at neither supranational nor 
international level. The European Commission found the Hungarian legislation (from 2015) to 
be incompatible with EU law, that is, the Asylum Procedures Directive (Directive 
2013/32/EU) and the Directive on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings (Directive 2010/64/EU), and opened an infringement procedure in 2015. In 2017, 
it dropped the investigation on the translation rules but still found inadequacies, in particular, 
concerning the implementation of the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Directive on Return 
(2008/115/EC), Reception Conditions (2013/33/EU), and several provisions of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.67  
Even if they are not closely related to the “crisis situation”, they are migration-related laws 
and, as such, cannot be left unmentioned. Stop Soros Law (2018), which criminalizes 
activities in support of asylum applications and further restricts the right to request asylum,68 
and the other Act on foreign-funded NGOs (2018)69 have also been challenged before the 
CJEU. Advocate General, in this latter case, concludes that this piece of legislation is 
incompatible with EU law because it restricts the free movement of capital and violates 
several fundamental rights.70  
 
As for the implementation of the asylum laws, also the ECtHR condemns Hungary. In 2017, it 
found a violation of the ECHR in the case of Ilias and Ahmed.71 Ilias and Ahmed were 
detained illegally and then forced to return to Serbia without the examination of their reasons 
for seeking asylum.72 The Grand Chamber, on the request of the Government, re-examined 
the case in 2019 and, based on a newly developed test, found that the detention was not 
unlawful. Therefore, the applicants’ right to liberty and security had not been infringed. It, 
however, upheld that authorities had violated the applicants’ fundamental rights by failing to 
properly examine the consequences they would be facing in case of their expulsion to 
Serbia.73 The Hungarian Minister of Justice opined that the judgment is in favor of the 
 
67 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6228_en.htm. See also other procedures on the asylum law, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/HR/IP_17_5023. 
68 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_4260 
69 European Commission v Hungary, Case C-78/18. 
70 P Bárd, ‘The Hungarian “Lex NGO” before the CJEU: Calling an Abuse of State Power by its Name’, 
VerfBlog, 2020/1/27, https://verfassungsblog.de/the-hungarian-lex-ngo-before-the-cjeu-calling-an-abuse-of-
state-power-by-its-name/ 
71 Ilias and Ahmed v Hungary (Application no 47287/15), judgment, 14.03.2017. Drinóczi and Mohay, n. 54.  
72 Act CXL of 2015. https://www.helsinki.hu/en/ilias-ahmed-ecthr-grand-chamber-ruling/ The applicants 
claimed that Hungary had violated their rights under Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment – 
in relation to reception conditions in the transit zone), Article 5 (the right to liberty and security – in relation to 
the rules on leaving the transit zone) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the ECHR. 
73 21 November 2019. For analysis and critic of the ruling, see https://www.helsinki.hu/en/ilias-ahmed-ecthr-
grand-chamber-ruling/. For a comparison of the two judgments, see 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Press_Q_A_Ilias_and_Ahmed_Hungary_ENG.pdf 
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government, and its border control is sovereign and legitimate,74 so no actions, including the 
inadequate provision of food in the detention centers, should be criticized. Between August 
2018 and March 2020, the ECtHR issued 18 emergency decisions and ordered the Hungarian 
government to give food to migrants in detention in the transit zone at the southern Hungarian 
border.75 In 2019, the European Commission opened new infringement for non-provision of 
food in transit-zones.76 According to the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, in November 2019, 
about 180 children are detained in the transit zones, and over the past two past years, more 
than 1,700 detainees were minors.77  
 
1.3. Agency: “deployment” of the military on Hungarian soil 
 
Under the modified Act on the Military of 2015, in a “crisis situation caused by mass 
migration”, armed Hungarian military forces may be used to assists the police in protecting 
and keeping order at the borders. In performing this task, the military operates under the Act 
on Police, but under the command of their military superiors, and simply assist and facilitate 
police operations. However, the “deployment” of the military within the territory of the state 
is expressis verbis excluded by the FL, with only one exception: in a “state of emergency”, 
the military may be deployed if police cannot maintain peace and order. Moreover, it is the 
constitutional duty of the police to protect the state borders.78 A joint reading of Articles 
45(1)79 and 50(1)80 FL does not support the power given by the Act to the military. It is 
doubtful that there are enough guarantees or that it is constitutionally legitimate for the 2015 
Act to render military staff operating in Hungary under the scope of the Act on Police without 
supporting rules in the constitution. The same question also arises in connection with the 
“state of terrorist threat” and the “state of danger”.81  
 
2. The Sixth Amendment – designing a new emergency: the devil is in the detail 
 
The Hungarian political decision-makers decided to address terror threats, as well. In this 
case, however, they opted for amending the FL by introducing a new type of “special legal 
order”.  
 
The draft of the Sixth Amendment of the FL was not made available in January 2016 when 
discussions began. What the general public could see was the debate on the content of the 
amendment in the political discourse. This version did not get the political support needed 
during the drafting process. The opposition claimed that the draft used vague language 
concerning the circumstances under which the new “state of terrorist threat” can be declared, 









78 Art 46(1) FL. 
79 Hungary’s armed forces shall be the Hungarian Defence Forces. The core duties of the Hungarian Defence 
Forces shall be the military defense of the independence, territorial integrity, and borders of Hungary, the 
performance of collective defense and peacekeeping tasks arising from international treaties, as well as the 
carrying out of humanitarian activities by the rules of international law.  
80 Should the use of the police and the national security services prove insufficient, the Hungarian Defence 
Forces may be used during a state of emergency. 
81 See point 2 below and point V.5. 
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territory of Hungary. A revised version of the draft, which again could not be found on any 
government website, was submitted to Parliament at the end of April 2016.82 The Hungarian 
Parliament adopted it without any modification as the Sixth Amendment.  
 
The text in Article 51/A on the “state of terrorist threat” seems to be in line with the internal 
logic of the chapter on “special legal order”. This Article is, however, somewhat more 
vaguely worded compared to the provisions on the other types of emergencies. For instance, 
contrary to the definitions applied to other “special legal orders”, Article 51/A covers not only 
the occurrence of the actual danger but also its probability (threat), which is usually sufficient 
only in the case of the gravest threats: “danger of external armed attack” or “danger of war”. 
The “state of terrorist threat” does not necessarily pose an equal danger. This difference may 
explain why two further problems should be pointed out. First, there is no efficient oversight 
of special decrees issued by the Government in the period between the initiation of the 
declaration of the “state of terrorist threat” in Parliament and its actual introduction by 
Parliament. The Government is only obliged to inform the President and the competent 
parliamentary committee about the measures issued. Similar rules are found in connection 
with the “state of preventive defense” (e.g., the danger of external armed attack), which, one 
might think, poses a greater danger and requires more immediate action, which may not be the 
case with a “state of terrorist threat”. Second, the army can be deployed within the territory of 
Hungary, provided that the police and national security agencies cannot resolve the situation, 
from the date of the proposal to introduce the “state of terrorist threat”. Similar provisions can 
be found in connection with a “state of emergency” (coup d’état and revolution). Again, 
though, there are significant differences between these two situations. The first is the nature of 
the problem that justifies the introduction of these emergencies. The second is the fact that the 
army is deployed during a “state of emergency” when so decided by the Parliament, or by the 
President if it is incapacitated, whereas, in a “state of terrorist threat”, the army can be 
deployed between the date of the request of the Government and the decision taken by 
Parliament to introduce the “state of terrorist threat”. The Article does not specify who can 
deploy the army; the sentence is formulated in the passive.83 It creates an easier way to control 
the army: the Government proposes the introduction of the “state of terrorist threat”, claiming 
a significant and direct threat of an attack, which it keeps secret for national security reasons, 
and the insufficiency of police forces, and takes direct control over the army. Otherwise, 
deployment would require the support of a two-thirds majority of the Parliament. 
All of these are mere theoretical assumptions, as this emergency has never been activated, 
unlike the "state of danger", which is the response to the COVID-19 crisis.  
 
V. COVID-19 and the “state of danger” 
 
The virus was first detected in Hungary on 4 March 2020. When we compare the timeline of 
governmental responses,84 we could say that the Hungarian Government moved relatively 
 
82 http://www.parlament.hu/irom40/10416/10416.pdf. 
83 Art 51/A(5): “The Hungarian Defence Forces may be deployed while the measures referred to in paragraph (3) 
are in force and during a state of terrorist threat if the use of the police and the national security services proves 
insufficient.” 
84 It seems that the reaction time of governments is around ten days, except in countries whose leaders does not 
take the pandemic seriously, like Brazil (T Bustamante and EP Neder Meyer, ‘Bolsonarism & Covid-19: Truth 
Strikes Back’, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Mar. 24, 2020, at: http://www.iconnectblog.com/2020/03/bolsonarism-and-
covid-19-truth-strikes-back/) or decided, first, to choose another epidemiological response, like the UK, which 
has been criticized by the WHO (https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-51683428.html, https://www.cambridge-
news.co.uk/news/uk-world-news/coronavirus-who-government-uk-strategy-17924466). Italy declared national 
state of emergency on 31 January (D Tega and M Massa, ‘Fighting COVID 19 – Legal Powers and Risks: Italy’, 
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fast, which, however, was not without controversies.85 When the “state of danger” was 
declared (11 March 2020), the number of those infected was 13; when the restrictions on 
schools, shops, state borders, schools, etc. were introduced on 16 March, the number of the 
infected was still low (36), and two of them had been cured. The restriction on movement was 
decided on 28 March, when the number of the infected was 256 (the cured: 34, the dead: 11). 
The spread of the virus slowed down by the beginning of April; it stayed below the European 
average. The reasons could be the low number of tests (37,326, on 15 April; 76,331 on 1 
May), the testing protocol (it is only done if symptoms are shown), the latent infected, and 
governmental measures that have been introduced in an early stage. The spread had 
accelerated by mid-April.86 The prime minister announced, at the end of April, that the 
restrictive measures would be gradually softened up starting with the first week of May. 
 
The situation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is dynamic and has provoked a harsh 
political fight with no hope for collaboration between the majority and the opposition. At the 
same time, the governing party has not forgotten about trying to take political advantage of 
the crisis.  
 
1. Events around the declaration of the “state of danger” 
 
The spread of the virus to Hungary, already in March 2020, prompted the population to 
exercise unprecedented social distancing, as advised by WHO and governmental bodies, made 
parents concerned about the spread of the coronavirus in schools and people demanded the 
possibility to stay at home (home-office), while many had been left without an income. It has 
had a continued effect on every aspect of life, without an exception. The primary aim of the 
Government was to avoid mass disease (as the health care system cannot deal with it). Legal 
restrictions on everyday life have been introduced gradually, as the infection spread. 
Hungary87 gradually closed theatres, cinemas, stores (excluding food stores), and restaurants. 
As a result, restaurants can be open until 3 pm. Students cannot attend schools and 
universities, but services are provided in the form of distance learning, which requires internet 
access and equipment. Borders are closed for passenger traffic; Hungarians can return home 
from abroad, but health check and the necessary precautionary measures are required. A 
humanitarian corridor is opened for nationals of neighboring countries of Hungary. There is a 
radical limitation on outside activities.  
 
 
VerfBlog, 2020/3/23, https://verfassungsblog.de/fighting-covid-19-legal-powers-and-risks-italy/). The Czech 
Republic, where the first case was reported on 1 March 2020, introduced emergency on 12 March 2020 
(https://www.statista.com/statistics/1104327/czechia-coronavirus-covid-19-new-cases/, 
https://home.kpmg/xx/en/home/insights/2020/04/czech-republic-government-and-institution-measures-in-
response-to-covid.html). Spain declared emergency on 14 March, 2020 but introduced certain restricted 
measures earlier; the first case in mainland was detected on 25 February. In Kenya, the first case was reported on 
6 March, and on 15 March, President Uhuru Kenyatta introduced severe restrictions, which resulted in, for 
instance closing universities (https://www.norway.no/contentassets/11be8d5a755f4807b40b498ec3a5ca17/press-
statement-by-he-15.03.pdf). 
85 These controversies might have rooted in undecidedness and hesitation: when the state of danger was declared 
(11 March, Wednesday), the Government did not talk about closing elementary and high schools until 13 March 
(Friday) when the prime minister changed what he said in the morning (no schools will be closed) and, in the 
evening, announced that schools would be closed from 16 March (Monday). 
86 www.koronavirus.gov.hu; http://abouthungary.hu/news-in-brief/coronavirus-heres-the-latest/ 
https://atlatszo.hu/2020/04/03/koronavirus-hirado-magyarorszagon-feltunoen-lassan-terjed-a-jarvany-a-
halalozasi-arany-magas/; https://atlo.team/koronamonitor/ 
87 Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, n 7.  
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Despite the law on banning meetings, the Parliament continues its activities as sessions are 
not to be considered gatherings.88 Transmission from the Hungarian Parliament became 
limited: journalists do not have permanent entry passes any longer (they are allowed to enter 
on a daily basis), they have to be healthy (although how this is checked remains unknown), 
and are encouraged to listen to the online transmission instead of personally attending 
parliamentary sessions. The public is informed through daily press conferences from the 
Operational Corps – a body helping the prime minister to manage the crisis. Since March 19, 
these are broadcast instead of taking place physically. Journalists can submit their questions 
beforehand; they either receive an answer or they do not. In the case of anti-government 
media, it is usually a “not”. In the beginning, the Operational Corps repeatedly did not answer 
questions concerning the public statistical data on the geographic range of the virus and did 
not give proper justification. They argued that the protection of privacy demands secrecy. 
This was despite the fact that only statistical data was requested; moreover, the personal 
medical data of those in statutory confinement has become public information. Those infected 
have to put a red document indicating the fact of the infection on their door in a clearly visible 
place. The government’s position has already been reconsidered, and, in April, they started to 
provide the data.  
 
Courts, prosecutors’ offices, and public notaries are operating under a special regime. They 
took an extraordinary break to avoid physical contact and, later, started to perform their 
activities remotely. The implementation of “judicial social distancing”, however, has a 
bearing on due process rights.89  
 
There is a restriction of movement, which does not ban leaving home for doing “essential” 
activities, since 28 March for 15 days, which, in April, was extended to an unlimited period. 
Its necessity is weekly reviewed. 
 
The number of the infected, the cured, and those who succumbed is growing,90 so does the 
number of unemployed people and bankrupt firms. Therefore, the Government has introduced 
financial and tax-related measures to ease the economic impact of the crisis, have made 
decisions to keep the state and the economy functioning.  
 
The legal basis of all of these actions was the declaration of the “state of danger” on 11 March 
2020.91 Since then, the Government issued the above-mentioned measures in the form of 
governmental decrees, as per the FL. In an effort to comply with the FL rules on the temporal 
effect of emergency decrees, the Government, before the expiry of these decrees (15 days), 
had submitted the “authorization bill”.92 This Bill became the Coronavirus Act 2020. To 
facilitate its adoption on time, the Government also requested a fast track procedure that 
combines accelerated process and deviation from other rules of the House. The fast track 
procedure, therefore, requires 4/5 majority of votes. The opposition did not support the fast 
track adoption; thus, the Bill could only be passed on March 30.  
 
 
88 The Parliament „must has sessions even during wartime". 
https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20200311/koronavirus-peldatlan-donteseket-hozott-meg-ma-a-magyar-
kormany-418965. It seems that the FL rule on the banning of termination of the Parliaments mandate in those 
two emergencies is interpreted correctly, with the rule of plus semper in se continet quod est minus. 
89 More on it, see below at point 5.  
90 https://koronavirus.gov.hu/, https://www.gov.pl/web/koronawirus/wykaz-zarazen-koronawirusem-sars-cov-2 
91 40/2020. (III.11) Korm.rend. a veszélyhelyzet kihirdetéséről [Government Decree 40/2020 on the declaration 
of the state of danger], http://njt.hu/translated/doc/J2020R0040K_20200311_FIN.pdf 
92 https://hungarianspectrum.org/2020/03/21/translation-of-draft-law-on-protecting-against-the-coronavirus/ 
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In the following points, I summarise the constitutional implications of the above process 
(point 4), the declaration of the “state of danger” (point 2), the Coronavirus Act (point 3), and 
the emergency governance by decree (point 5). I also offer an explanation of why the 
Hungarian crisis is being managed like this, and what else could have been done – provided 
that Hungary still accommodated “normal” constitutionalism (point 6).  
 
2. The activation of the constitutional emergency regime 
 
Article 53 of the FL says that the “state of danger” can be declared in the event of a natural 
disaster [elemi csapás] or industrial accident endangering life and property, or to mitigate its 
consequences; it does not provide further explanation. The FL does not refer expressis verbis 
to a human pandemic, either – constitutions usually do not mention it. It appears only in the 
corresponding Act on catastrophes (2011) under its heading of “state of danger”. Under this 
heading, the Act groups events that can trigger Article 53 FL in three categories – i) “natural 
disaster [elemi csapás], natural dangers”; ii) “industrial accident, civilizational dangers”; iii) 
other dangers – and provides for exemplificative lists. It includes “human pandemic” under 
category iii). As per the FL, the Act also contains the subject matters relating to which the 
extraordinary measures and decrees can be issued in the “state of danger”, with which the 
content of the governmental decrees introduced in the first weeks does not correspond 
precisely. It is discussed below.  
 
At the moment, there are five readings of the activation of Article 53 of the FL. The first is the 
opinion of the Government, which claims that the declaration of the emergency is 
constitutional, and each measure has been necessary. The second claims that normal-times 
measures could have been adequate to manage the defense against COVID-19.93 The third 
argues that the Act – already in 2011 – unconstitutionally expanded the meaning of the FL; 
therefore, the Government declared the emergency without a constitutional ground – it is 
viewed as another sign of dictatorship.94 Along this train of thought, there is a fourth opinion. 
It also claims the unconstitutional expansion of the FL definition but acknowledges the 
necessity of the deviation from the too closed system of constitutional emergency regimes. At 
the same time, they call for respecting constitutional principles and the reconsideration of the 
regulatory depth of the constitutional emergency regime.95 Based on the actual threat of 
COVID-19 and the management of the crisis in the first four weeks, and the constitutional and 
statutory design of defense against human pandemics, I still think that the actions of the 
Hungarian government simply show the business-as-usual functioning of illiberal 
constitutionalism.96  
 
The Act on catastrophes, which is to be applied in a constitutional emergency, similarly to the 
Act on the health care ruling on pandemics under the regular legal order, are not designed for 
managing anything similar to COVID-19. This virus is, unlike floods and ordinary flu, not 
 
93 G Halmai and KL Scheppele, ‘Orbán is Still the Sole Judge of his Own Law’, VerfBlog, 2020/4/30, 
https://verfassungsblog.de/orban-is-still-the-sole-judge-of-his-own-law/ 
94 G Halmai, ’How COVID-19 Unveils the True Autocrats: Viktor Orbán’s Ermächtigungsgesetz’, Int’l J. Const. 
L. Blog, Apr. 1, 2020, http://www.iconnectblog.com/2020/04/how-covid-19-unveils-the-true-autocrats-viktor-
orbans-ermachtigungsgesetz/; A Schiffer, ‘Különleges jogbizonytalanság [Extraordinary legal uncertainty]’, 
https://mandiner.hu/cikk/20200313_kulonleges_jogbizonytalansag (13 March 2020), KL Scheppele, ‘Orbán’s 
emergency’, https://hungarianspectrum.org/2020/03/21/kim-lane-scheppele-orbans-emergency/, 
https://verfassungsblog.de/pandemic-as-constitutional-moment/ 
95 Cs Tordai, ‘A közjog határai a járványveszély idején [Limits of public law during pandemic]’, 
https://igyirnankmi.atlatszo.hu/2020/03/16/a-kozjog-hatarai-a-jarvanyveszely-idejen/ (16 March 2020). 
96 Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, n 7.  
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restricted to a specific location or a specified period. It is also highly contagious without a 
vaccine, unlike regular flu or other infectious diseases Hungary could encounter.  
There are arguments that adequate crisis management could have been performed based on 
the ordinary legal regime, such as the Act on health care (1997). It is a debate which, most 
probably, cannot be resolved at all – as the emergency was declared and measures that were 
deemed necessary to keep pace with reality have been issued. Under a regular regime, when a 
statutory-based “pandemic crisis” (Act on health care) should have been declared, the 
following normal-times tools could have been used: statutes, ordinary governmental decrees, 
and the possibility of the Chief Medical Officer to issue rules. The Chief Medical Officer 
would have led the fight against COVID-19 – in this case. Fast responses were, however, 
needed in every sphere of life, especially during the first phase of the pandemic. Nevertheless, 
the normal legislative process takes time, governmental decrees need to respect legal 
hierarchy, and the Chief Medical Officer can act only within the framework of the Act on 
health care. It is highly questionable if, exclusively based on this Act, some measures could 
have been introduced at all. For instance, whether education institutions could have been 
closed, changes in the working environment, and the practice of courts could have been 
allowed, and certain economic measures, e.g., on the use of PIN codes and loans,97 could have 
been introduced. Again, there was a massive popular demand and need for these - the law 
caught up. 
 
Therefore, it can be argued that neither the Act on catastrophes (with the constitutional 
emergency) nor the Act on health care (as a normal-time measure) was de facto fit for the 
COVID-19 crisis management purposes. Nevertheless, again, considering the gravity of the 
pandemic, the changes it caused, and the statutory design explained above would make us 
conclude that de jure, declaring the “state of danger” seemed to be the only available option. 
It needs to be added that not even the opposition rejected the idea of declaring an emergency.  
 
3. The Coronavirus Act 2020 – authorization Act implementing the FL  
 
Nevertheless, interestingly enough, whatever position we take on the constitutionality of the 
declaration of the emergency, it does not matter as it does not alter the constitutional 
deficiencies of the Coronavirus Act (2020). This Act is the “authorization Act”, and it is as 
controversial as the constitutionality of the activation of the “state of danger”.  
The Coronavirus Act mainly repeats and implements the FL, e.g., on the CC, the possibility of 
governmental law-making, including the suspension of and derogation from legislative 
provisions, the requirement of necessity, and proportionality. The Coronavirus Act does 
require regular reporting to the Parliament on the measures taken and allows the body to 
withdraw its infinite authorization, in terms of both time and subject matter, at any time. The 
parliamentary majority of Fidesz, however, makes this guarantee quite meaningless.  
It also does not allow any by-elections and referenda, and the representative body of the local 
government cannot be dissolved. This rule might be viewed as attacking democracy. 
Nevertheless, considering the results of the local elections in 2019,98 it is doubtful that this 
action was motivated by political ill-will. Besides, this measure is introduced in a crisis (in 
which social distancing is a rational demand), in a cardinal Act, following the logic of the FL 
on the termination of the mandate of the other elected body (Parliament shall operate 
continuously). This restriction is also in line with FL’s human rights derogation provision, as 
far as the subject matter is concerned. 
 
97 Among the first measures, the Government, e.g., raised the limit of paying with card without inserting the PIN 
(from 5,000 to 15,000 HUF) and suspended loan payments to banks until the end of the year. 
98 https://icds.ee/local-elections-in-hungary-orban-no-longer-invincible-but-his-party-is-still-the-strongest/ 
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It permanently adds two crimes – violating epidemical confinement and spreading false 
information during the “state of danger” – to the Criminal Code. From an emergency drafting 
perspective, both rules are below standard. Both crimes are new ones, which could have been 
adopted in an ordinary legislative procedure if it had not been urgent to address the issues the 
Government wanted to address. On the other hand, the application of the second crime is 
restricted to the “state of danger”. As such, it has become a provisional rule in the body of the 
regular criminal regime. Contentwise, it is primarily the second one that gives rise to 
suspicion because it is vaguely defined and very complicated at the same time. It most 
probably will not assist the correct application and might be able to discourage critical 
opinions, but it may be used against real fake-news, as well. We will see how it will be 
applied, and to what extent it indeed poses a chilling effect on journalists and academia. 
 
Nevertheless, the Coronavirus Act is unconstitutional on, at least, three grounds. First, it does 
not observe the 15 days rule of the FL. Second, it legitimizes ex-post-facto the decrees that 
were issued outside of the scope of the Act on catastrophes, i.e., without a proper 
constitutional ground. Third, it consented to other decrees to be adopted in the future, thus 
excluding any meaningful parliamentary oversight.  
The government argues that the 15 days rule is not applied because, first, no one knows if the 
Parliament could have sessions at all in the future. On the other hand, they have not 
introduced or even thought about adding any remote voting or discussion system – unlike 
other parliaments.99 Second, they claim that the Parliament can withdraw its authorization at 
any time – which is true. Still, it requires the Parliament to act – which is contrary to the FL, 
which ex lege terminates the temporal effect of the decrees after 15 days. The ex-post facto 
consent on the content of the already issued decrees and the future authorization, regardless of 
the content, jointly serve to create the legal ground for decrees that had been issued outside of 
the scope of the Act on catastrophes (2011) between the declaration of the emergency (11 
March) and the adoption of the Coronavirus Act (30 March). As for the other decrees adopted 
under the authorization of the Coronavirus Act, this latter serves as an implementing Act, 
which therefore complies with the constitutional requirement of having a cardinal Act on the 
emergency ex-ante. That is how the Government would argue. Whether we accept or reject 
this argument depends on our interpretation of the ex-ante rule of the FL and our general 
assessment of the state of Hungarian constitutionalism. It is a reasonable counter-argument 
that the Government’s opinion disregards the obvious claim that the condition of having an 
implementing Act ex-ante should mean “prior to the declaration of emergency”, and that it 
should actually implement the constitutional provisions, even contentwise. Otherwise, it does 
not provide any guarantee. Nor there is a guarantee in a political situation in which the 
governing force has 2/3 majority in the Parliament that has a record of abusing emergency 
regimes.  
 
The most important question concerning the Coronavirus Act might not be whether certain 
Articles are cardinal acts or not, or whether indefinite authorization can be withdrawn by a 
simple or a two-third majority of the Parliament,100 but whether the Government would be 
 
99 For an insight into the functioning of parliaments, during the epidemic see Ittai Bar Siman Tov, ‘Parliamentary 
Activity and Legislative Oversight during the Coronavirus Pandemic – A Comparative Overview’, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3566948 
100 G Halmai and KL Scheppele, ‘Don’t Be Fooled by Autocrats!: Why Hungary’s Emergency Violates Rule of 
Law’, VerfBlog, 2020/4/22, https://verfassungsblog.de/dont-be-fooled-by-autocrats/. See also the response to this 
latter blog: D Karsai, ‘Let’s not fool ourselves either!: Some remarks on Professor Halmai’s and Professor 
Scheppele’s blogpost’, VerfBlog, 2020/4/27, https://verfassungsblog.de/lets-not-fool-ourselves-either/; Halmai 
and Scheppele, n. 93. 
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ready to rreissuedecrees without even a formal authorization.101 It is because, under the 
Hungarian political and constitutional setting, not even the two-third majority would stop the 
Government from issuing emergency decrees. Should the authorization be withdrawn, the 
same content could be reissued in another emergency decree, which then would be in effect 
for 15 days (according to the FL). For extension, the support of the majority of the Parliament 
should be asked. The Parliament did not give it, so decrees would be reissued. Right now, 
however, it seems that the Government observes its idea of its illiberal understanding of the 
Rule of Law, i.e., illiberal legality102 and refrains from reissuing emergency decrees (see also 
the in-between period below). 
 
4. The in-between period  
 
As has been said, the opposition did not agree to discuss the Coronavirus bill on a fast-track 
process. They would have supported the bill if it had not eliminated the 15 days rule. 
Moreover, according to their submissions, they would have agreed on a more prolonged 
temporal effect (even 90 days) – what they wanted to insist on were the actual oversight and 
limited authorization.103 
Nevertheless, the Government had to deal with the decrees, whose temporal effect had 
expired. It could have reissued them – as those who claim that Hungary is under a dictatorship 
might have expected. Instead, it seemed that it would choose another, less, or not at all, 
unconstitutional variation. The original idea was first to ask the managing authority of 
universities and nurseries to extend the break, under their discretion, so that the students can 
legally be kept away from the premises. Second, the Minister of Interior was to issue an order 
on the control on the internal Schengen borders. The Minister of Justice and the President of 
the National Judicial Office would have discussed the extraordinary break at courts. 
Unfortunately, a purely unconstitutional choice was preferred: On 26 March, the Chief 
Medical Officer issued a normative decision, which repeated the content of the decrees on 
universities and the border. Based on merely the Act on health care, this normative decision is 
illegitimate. The Chief Medical Officer can issue decisions only when there is a declared 
statutory-based “pandemic crisis”, and only within the scope of the Act. As said above, it is 
not the statute-based “pandemic crisis” but the constitutional “state of danger” is the legal 
order under which Hungary is being governed. There are some subject matters in which the 
Act does not authorize them to rule, e.g., entering the country. It was, however, only a 
temporary measure, as based on the Coronavirus Act, the Government extended the effect of 
the decrees and, since then, keeps issuing new ones.  
 
Nevertheless, what we can see is a careful “balancing” of illiberal constitutionalism in an 
emergency – the process observes illiberal legality. The emergency decrees whose temporal 
effect has expired were not reissued, which would have been blatant unconstitutionality. 
Instead, another more or less legal solution was chosen – something which is less clearly 
unconstitutional and could legally be defended as there is a legal basis (Act on health care), 
and there is a power of the Chief Medical Officer to rule. While keeping pace with reality in 
the first 15 days, the Government was also eager to create a legal environment, which, 
according to its understanding, legitimizes the possible unconstitutional but seemingly needed 
and already issued emergency measures. This effort culminated in the Coronavirus Act, 
which, as said, also implements the constitution and eliminates the constitutional guarantee of 
 
101 Halmai and Scheppele fear that it is possible. Halmai and Scheppele, n. 93. 
102 T Drinóczi, ‘The European Rule of Law and illiberal legality in illiberal constitutionalism: the case of 
Hungary’, MTA LWP 2019/16, https://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/2019_16_Drinoczi.pdf 
103 The other neuralgic point was the above-mentioned amendment of the Criminal Code.  
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temporality. Another example of this “balancing” exercise is how the emergency decrees 
enter into force, which is discussed below. 
 
5. Governing by decrees  
 
The Hungarian Parliament, similarly to the other state authorities, operates under the “danger 
of crisis”. Yet, it still delivers regular legislative activities as emergency “legislation” is 
conducted through governmental decree as per the Coronavirus Act 2020 voted for on 30 
March. It challenges the argument of the Government relating the concern on how long the 
Parliament can operate. No parliamentary sessions have been rescheduled, and no “remote 
procedures” have been discussed, while the Government is busy preparing both emergency 
decrees and regular bills. Many thought that the Coronavirus Act would be a door to 
dictatorship, as it gives unlimited power to the executive.104 I think that, instead, it is still 
about how populist autocrat-led illiberal constitutionalism works. Let us not forget about the 
supermajority the governing party has in Parliament. So, further concentrating the power 
(Coronavirus Act), pursuing conservative policies (e.g., refusal of legal recognition of trans 
people), pleasing oligarchs (e.g., providing real estate free of charge to loyal funds, 
“outsourcing” higher education), reforming entire sectors (e.g., withdrawing the status of civil 
servant from those employed in the cultural sector), it is all done by the Acts of Parliament 
through omnibus legislation105 or ordinary governmental decrees. Evidently, emergency 
decrees, especially those on the use of the military, financial matters, and take away or 
controlling property, could help in the endeavor to build a kind of soft totalitarian regime. But 
the vast majority of the emergency degrees, so far, have been used for crisis management. 
Besides, the content of emergency decrees could easily be transformed into statutes with the 
assistance of the Parliament.106   
 
Based on the unspecified authorization of the Coronavirus Act, these decrees cover each 
aspect of life, including all types of legal procedures, the operation of legal persons, 
correctional facilities, post offices, child and social care, education at every level, data 
protection, traffic and transportation, the budget and the economy, the health care, partial 
restriction of movement and its indefinite extension with a weekly review, military assistance 
in the implementation of preventing measures, and their presence in hospitals and essential 
industrial companies, etc.107  
 
From a drafting perspective, governmental decrees are “socially distant”108 decrees, more 
precisely, “illiberally distant” from the ordinary body of law. Regardless of the indefinite 
authorization of the Coronavirus Act, the emergency decrees “truthfully” observe this Act and 
the 15-day rule of the FL. They employ a two-tiered entry into force technique: the decree, 
except for one provision, comes into force ex nunc. That particular provision, which does not 
come into force with the decree, enters into force after 15 days, and it is this that extends the 
temporal effect of the decree as per the Coronavirus Act. Their titles contain the expression of 
 
104 Halmai and Scheppele, n. 100.  
105 The bills on these issued have been submitted to Parliament. The Coronavirus Act has already been adopted.  
106 This seems to be already happening concerning economy related measures. See, the bills submitted on 21 and 




108 For the expression, see the presentation of Ronan Cormacain in the webinar organized by the Bingham Centre 
on 2 April 2020.  
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the “state of danger”; their authorization provisions refer to the FL and, after its adoption, the 
Coronavirus Act. The government decrees do not “amend” statutes, they “derogate” from 
their rules.  
No other ways of “social distancing” are, however, applied: emergency governmental decrees 
are not collected separately on any websites; the usual regime governs their publication and 
accessibility.109 It is not easy to find out what the new legal order looks like, as there are many 
decrees, and they cover all aspects of life (see below). In just the first six weeks, more than 50 
decrees were issued. Some of them regulate the same matters; some have a nature of omnibus 
legislation; others amend the previously published emergency decrees. Being government 
decrees, they do not go through any formal consultation process, they are drafted in one or 
two days, and they do not have explanatory memoranda either.  
 
Contentwise, they mitigate the legal consequences of the pandemic by avoiding personal 
contacts and, in turn, expanding the use of ICT tools in every legal sphere where they are 
applicable. Therefore, for instance, schools and universities undertake digital teaching and can 
also organize online exams in cases in which it is otherwise not allowed. Deadlines do not 
expire, so no one, including those involved in criminal procedures, can be adversely affected 
by the changed circumstances. Justice in civil and administrative cases is provided remotely, 
without personal presence being required. Judges base their decision on ICT, documents, and 
written statements. Personal appearance can only be requested in criminal procedures, and it 
is only granted when it does not breach “quarantine rules”. New misdemeanor conducts are 
stipulated in decrees. Ministerial letters, not a formal source of law, demand the emptying of 
hospital beds for future COVID-patients. On the other hand, prisoners are not released.  
So, sadly, beyond their being formally unconstitutional because of the constitutional 
deficiencies of the Coronavirus Act, some of the decrees may suffer from substantial 
unconstitutionality as well – regardless of how they intended to provide for adequate legal 
background for the changed circumstances. Some of the measures may raise doubts 
concerning the appropriateness of the legal source (notwithstanding the authorization), 
proportionality, and the right to due process (principle of directness), and the right of the 
child, e.g., their right to education. It should imply the right to access teaching materials and 
receive actual instruction in any form available. However, there are no provisions right now in 
the legal system to ensure that each student has effective access to them.   
 
Economic and financial measures are also introduced in decrees. Notably, this is the field in 
which the mid- and long-term uncertainty, lack of cooperation, and the purpose of taking 
political advantage are palpable, and the intention of bypassing EU law might be present. This 
latter could have a bearing on the weak constraint power we argue that EU law has in illiberal 
constitutionalism.110  
The prime minister said that the economy would soon stop, so it would need to be restarted. 
Among the first measures, the Government, e.g., raised the limit of paying with credit/debit 
card without inserting the PIN (from 5,000 to 15,000 HUF) and suspended loan payments to 
banks until the end of the year. It introduced an economic package (financial protection plan) 
on 6 April – the opposition and the economists are not satisfied. They claim that the package 
is “too little” and “too late” (it should have been announced 2-3 weeks before). Besides 
targeting the vulnerable, the decrees do not take good care of every vulnerability, such as 
certain types of self-employment, firms, unemployed, and poor people.  
 
109 See, e.g., magyarkozlony.hu and njt.hu. 
110 Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, n. 4. 
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There is a decree which takes away some of the income of local governments, which they are 
entitled to from parking fees but does not order easing their tasks.111 Another decree 
designates “special economic areas,” which, subsequently, are being controlled by the county 
municipalities (where the governing party has a majority) instead of the municipal 
governments in territories where, for instance, a factory (e.g., Samsung plant) is located. This 
designation has tax and ownership implications as well: it will be the county, instead of the 
city, that collects taxes and gains ownership of properties owned by the town. Critics say that 
there are at least two political intentions behind this measure, which pretends to assists the 
defense against the economic effects of the pandemic. First, it is used to render the operation 
of an opposition-led town impossible.112 Second, the Government wants to support Samsung, 
even if it needs to disregard the opinions of the residents and bypass EU law on direct state 
support.113 Both reasons and the pretense of the Government fits the logic of illiberalism, 
while bypassing EU law shows the ever-weakening constraining power of EU law. An 
opposition politician requested the ombudsman to form an opinion about this measure.114 The 
ombudsman could initiate a constitutional review, and when it happens, it will be the packed 
Constitutional Court, which will decide.  
 
Another area of concern is the presence of the military, which seems to be extra-constitutional 
as it is not the emergency that allows their use. On the other hand, the military is not 
“deployed”, for now. It assists the police, the non-healing related management of hospitals, 
and provides for the protection of essential infrastructure (with the use of weapons). However, 
the legal basis for sending them to 140 essential facilities, as planned, and the selection of 
these essential services are not exactly clear.115  
 
6. Why is it like this? What else could have been done?  
 
All of the above might be based on a misunderstood mission of the prime minister, who 
quickly become the responsible person for managing the coronavirus crisis,116 and who does 
so according to a “military plan”.117 It seems to be aligned with illiberal populism that is also 
characterized with arrogance and a messianic sense of mission.118 
 
This latter is what prevents him from cooperating with the opposition, tolerating constitutional 
oversight, and letting things out of his hand. Government by decrees seems to be about this 
and crisis management. Even if the Parliament operates normally, there is no apparent will to 
restore the ordinary legislative power of the Parliament in crisis-related issues. The 
Government/prime minister thinks that they are the only ones that can adequately address the 






112 Karsai, n. 100. 
113 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_19_6078 
114 https://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20200425_Ombudsman_elott_a_godi_kulonleges_gazdasagi_ovezet 
115 In an omnibus legislation bill, the relevant Act is planned to be completely changed. The rules will be 
applicable to the current crisis as well. It seems that the statutory basis of governmental actions is being created 
ex post facto.  
116 The prime minister created ten action groups on/for: education; constructing mobile hospitals; security of 
essential companies; international coordination; communication; emergency legal order; financials; rebooting 
economy; coronavirus research; border control. 
117 https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20200320/orban-viktor-egy-katonai-akcioterv-szerint-dolgozunk-420773 
118 Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała, n. 4 (2018). 
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without doubt that the Hungarian legal system is “overregulated”. Everything is regulated by 
statutes; governmental decrees and ministerial decrees implement the statutes; self-regulating 
bodies have regulations implementing all of the mentioned laws. Those who apply the law 
need a hard law to be applied. The COVID-19 pandemic, due to its global and highly 
infectious nature and the primarily used countermeasures, such as social distancing and self-
isolation, has hardly left any area of life intact. Therefore, it has demanded immediate and 
effective responses, which cannot precisely be planned as no one knows when the pandemic 
will be over. Re-designing the legal system as a response to the COVID-19 crisis seems to be 
a legitimate need in Hungary. Its method, form, and extent are what remain to be assessed 
from constitutional, supranational, and human rights perspectives.  
 
This pandemic will not end soon, and it affects all of us. Therefore, after issuing the most vital 
measures and taking the most necessary steps in the first couple of weeks, the ministries, in a 
“normal” kind of constitutionalism, could have realized this. They could have started to 
cooperate with stakeholders and parliamentary factions to develop the statutory base of all the 
measures, which the Parliament could have even voted for in a fast track procedure. In this 
way, all the constitutional inadequacies that occurred during the first two weeks could have 
been remedied. As said, no political forces opposed the declaration of the emergency and the 
measures of the first two weeks. Nor was the intention of the Government to try to prevent the 
sudden outbreak of the virus, which would have been catastrophic to the health care system, 
criticized. On the contrary, in some cases, more severe restrictions are demanded.  
 
IV. Conclusion  
 
I conclude in four points. First, Hungary indeed exemplifies how to be constitutionally well 
equipped but still able to abuse constitutional emergency and refine them when it seems to be 
absolutely necessary. That is, however, what can be expected from illiberal constitutionalism. 
We shall wait and see where Hungary will find itself when the COVID-19 pandemic is over. 
Depending on how the Prime Minister responds to the factual end of the pandemic and the 
changes ordinary legislation will make, we will see whether our hybrid regime has indeed 
turned out to be an authoritarian system. 
 
Second, no matter how detailed a constitution is, not even under the constitutional and judicial 
model can abusive political regimes be legally prevented from abusing the constitution. 
During emergencies, the legal framework, including checks and balances and other 
guarantees, is of the utmost importance. Based on the experiences of the last 30 years and the 
current crisis, it is found that, in Hungary, the abuse and misuse of constitutional emergency 
have two layers. The first layer is the actual abuse of emergency powers, be those extra-
constitutional (since 2015) or (partially) non-constitutional (2020). The second layer is the 
abusive regulation of emergencies and powers (all three) by bypassing constitutional 
procedures and resorting to secrecy, including the non-transparency of decisions and vague 
drafting. For a constitutional democracy, none of them is less dangerous than the other; for 
illiberal constitutionalism, it is business-as-usual.  
 
Third, the Hungarian governance by decree illustrates a kind of socially-distant legislation and 
has a sense of order. As such, notwithstanding its questionable legitimacy and extensive, 
sometimes disproportionate use, does not seem to have caused much turmoil in the legal 
system – from a pure drafting technique perspective until the end of April 2020. Emergency 
measures, as a separate body of laws, can easily be removed from the legal system. The FL 
only requires another source of law, most probably a decree, in which the Government 
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declares the end of the “state of danger”. From a drafting perspective, and for the sake of legal 
certainty, it would be more welcome if it also provided for a detailed list of all the decrees that 
lose their effect. The Coronavirus Act will automatically become inapplicable by the 
declaration of the end of the emergency. Formally, it can be removed from the legal system 
by another Act of Parliament. Other rules adopted as a regular amendment to a statute, such as 
the changes to the Criminal Code in the Coronavirus Act, or other rules on emergency 
measures, continue to be part of the legal system but could be applied only when a human 
pandemic emergency is declared.  
 
Lastly, this worldwide pandemic is a test for any type of constitutionalism, and it challenges 
our way of thinking about them. It makes us reconsider the constitutional design and revisit 
our understanding of boundaries. It warns us that extraordinary times require extraordinary 
measures, but not without observing the basic foundations of social co-existence, as well as 
the core values of constitutional democracy. When a legal system is, notwithstanding its 
detailed rules on pandemics and constitutional rules on emergencies, unprepared for a 
COVID-19-type crisis, it is challenging for governments and parliaments to provide adequate 
responses. They are expected to act quickly and efficiently. They are also required to respect 
the coherence of the legal system in a situation that no-one could foresee and, at the beginning 
of which, no-one could precisely predict when it would end, and exactly what human and 
economic sacrifices will be involved. The Hungarian treatment of COVID-19 crisis reminds 
us to secure a solid factual basis for our assessment.119 It also warns us to look, with an open 
mind, at the whole picture that provides for the social, political, and legal framework of the 
Hungarian crisis management – which is, so far (April 2020), illiberal constitutionalism.  
 
119 Similarly, see Karsai, n. 100.  
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